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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we propose a tractable variant of the open economy neoclassical growth model that emphasizes
political economy and contracting frictions. The political economy frictions involve disagreement
and political turnover, while the contracting friction is a lack of commitment regarding foreign debt
and expropriation. We show that the political economy frictions induce growth dynamics in a limited-commitment
environment that would otherwise move immediately to the steady state. In particular, greater political
disagreement corresponds to a high tax rate on investment, which declines slowly over time, generating
slow convergence to the steady state. While in the standard neoclassical growth model capital’s share
in production plays an important role in determining the speed of convergence, this parameter is replaced
by political disagreement in our open economy reformulation. Moreover, while political frictions shorten
the horizon of the government, the government may still pursue a path of tax rates in which the first
best investment is achieved in the long run, although the transition may be slow. The model rationalizes
why openness has different implications for growth depending on the political environment, why institutions
such as respect for property rights evolve over time, why governments in open countries that grow
rapidly tend to accumulate net foreign assets rather than liabilities, and why foreign aid may not affect
growth.
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In this paper we present a tractable growth model that highlights the interaction of po-
litical disagreement, tax policy, and capital ﬂows in a small open economy. We augment
the standard neoclassical growth model with two frictions. First, there is limited commit-
ment on the part of the domestic government. Speciﬁcally, capital income is subject to
ex-post expropriation and the government can default on external debt. Second, politi-
cal parties with distinct objectives compete for power. We show that the combination of
these two frictions generate several prominent features of developing economy growth
experiences, including the fact that economies with relatively high growth rates tend to
have governments that accumulate large net foreign asset positions.
ThemodelbuildsontheinsightofAlesinaandTabellini(1990)andPerssonandSvens-
son (1989) that political disagreement between potential incumbents makes parties prefer
spending to occur while in ofﬁce. As in Amador (2004), we show that the political en-
vironment can be conveniently modeled as a sequence of incumbents that possess quasi-
hyperbolicpreferences. Weembedthispoliticalprocessinasmallopeneconomyinwhich
the government can expropriate capital and default on external debt. In this limited com-
mitment environment, we show that the time inconsistent preferences of the government
induce interesting dynamics for both investment and external debt that are consistent
with prominent features of the data.
Speciﬁcally, we consider the path of taxes, consumption, investment, and sovereign
debt, that maximizes the population’s welfare subject to the constraint that each incum-
bent has the power to repudiate debt and expropriate capital. Deviation, however, leads
to ﬁnancial autarky and reversion to a high tax-low investment equilibrium. In this sense,
we study self-enforcing equilibria in which allocations are constrained by the govern-
ment’s lack of commitment, as in Thomas and Worrall (1994), Alburquerque and Hopen-
hayn (2004), and Aguiar et al. (2009). These papers discuss how limited commitment can
slow capital accumulation. A main result of the current paper is that the political econ-
omy frictions generate additional dynamics. In particular, we show that the degree of
disagreement among political parties has a ﬁrst order (negative) effect on the speed of the
economy’s convergence to the steady state. In the standard closed economy version of
the neoclassical growth model, the speed of convergence is governed in large part by the
capital share parameter. In our reformulation, capital share is replaced with a parameter
reﬂecting the extent of political disagreement.
The intuition behind the dynamics begins with debt overhang. A country with a large
2external sovereign debt position has a greater temptation to default, and therefore cannot
credibly promise to leave large investment positions un-expropriated. Growth therefore
requires the country to pay down its debt, generating a trade off between the incumbent’s
desiretoconsumewhileinofﬁceagainstreducingforeignliabilitiesandincreasinginvest-
ment. In a political environment with a high degree of disagreement, governments are
unwilling to reduce their sovereign debt quickly, as the desire for immediate consump-
tion outweighs the future beneﬁts of less overhanging debt. In this manner, the model is
able to reconcile the mixed results that countries have had with ﬁnancial globalization.
Countries with different underlying political environments will have different growth
experiences after opening: some economies will borrow and stagnate, while others will
experience net capital outﬂows and grow quickly.
Moreover, we show that introducing foreign aid does not alter the dynamics of the
capital stock in our benchmark economy. If foreign aid is not conditioned on ex post
capital tax rates or the repayment of external debt, aid does not relax the government’s
credibility constraint. That is, foreign aid without conditionality does not affect the dy-
namics of tax rates, capital accumulation, or growth. On the other hand, although debt
relief does not have long run effects, it increases investment and output in the short run.
This is consistent with the empirical literature that ﬁnds mixed or insigniﬁcant results
regarding the effect of aid on growth, and more robust positive effects of the debt relief
programs.1
Political disagreement in our model generates short-term impatience, but is distinct
from a model of an impatient decision maker with time consistent preferences. For ex-
ample, in our framework the degree of political disagreement may not affect the long
run capital stock. In particular, if the private agents discount at the world interest rate,
the economy eventually reaches the ﬁrst best level of capital for any ﬁnite level of dis-
agreement. This reﬂects the fact that while incumbents disproportionately discount the
near future, this relative impatience disappears as the horizon is extended far into the fu-
ture. However, the level of political disagreement will determine the level of steady state
debt that supports the ﬁrst best capital. Moreover, if private agents are impatient relative
to the world interest rate, the private discount factor interacts with the level of political
disagreement to determine the steady state level of capital.
The mechanism in our paper is consistent with the empirical fact that fast growth is
accompanied by reductions in net foreign liabilities, the so-called “allocation puzzle” of
1See Rajan and Subramanian (2008) and Arslanalp and Henry (2006) for recent analysis of aid and debt
relief.
3Gourinchas and Jeanne (2007) (see also Aizenman et al., 2004 and Prasad et al., 2006). This
allocation puzzle represents an important challenge to the standard open economy model
which predicts that opening an economy to capital inﬂows will speed convergence, as the
constraint that investment equals domestic savings is relaxed.2 Our model rationalizes
the allocation puzzle as capital will not be invested in an economy with high debt due to
the risk of expropriation. This provides an incentive for the government to pay down its
external debt along the transition path. The model also addresses the related question of
why many countries fail to pursue the high growth-low debt strategy. The incentive to
pay down debt is opposed by the desire to spend due to political disagreement. In coun-
tries with particularly severe political disagreement, the incentive to pay down external
debt takes a back seat and growth suffers.
Our model emphasizes sovereign debt overhang. In particular, external debt matters
in the model to the extent that the government controls repayment or default. While
the allocation puzzle has been framed in the literature in terms of aggregate net foreign
assets (both public and private), the appropriate empirical measure for our mechanism
is public net foreign assets. Figure 1 documents that the allocation puzzle is driven by
the net foreign asset position of the public sector. Speciﬁcally, we plot growth in GDP
per capita (relative to the U.S.) against the change in the ratio of the government’s net
foreign assets to GDP, where the net position is deﬁned as international reserves minus
public and publicly guaranteed external debt.3 Figure 1 depicts a clear, and statistically
signiﬁcant, relationship between growth and the change in the government’s external net
assets.
We should emphasize that this relationship is not driven by fast growing governments
borrowing heavily at the beginning of the sample period – the relationship between ini-
tial government assets and subsequent growth is weakly positive. Moreover, it is not
simply that governments save during transitory booms and borrow during busts. As
documented by Kaminsky et al. (2004), ﬁscal surpluses in developing economies are neg-
atively correlated with income at business cycle frequencies . Figure 1 therefore reﬂects
2Two important papers that study the neoclassical growth model in an open economy setting are Barro
et al. (1995), who introduce human capital accumulation and a credit market imperfection to obtain non-
trivial dynamics, and Ventura (1997). In the open economy version of the neoclassical model studied by
Barro et al. (1995), the debt to output ratio is constant along the transition path if the production function
is Cobb-Douglas. More generally, their prediction is for an economy to unambiguously accumulate net
liabilities as it accumulates capital. See Castro (2005) for a careful quantitative exploration of whether
open economy models with incomplete markets and technology shocks can account for the patterns of
development observed in the data.
3See the notes to the ﬁgures for data sources and sample selection. See also the end of Appendix A for a
discussion of an augmented model with exogenous growth.
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Figure 1: This ﬁgure plots average annual growth in real GDP per capita relative to the U.S.
against the change in ratio of public net foreign assets to GDP between 1970–2004. Public net
foreign assets are international reserves (excluding gold) minus public and publicly guaran-
teed external debt, both from WDI. Real GDP per capita is constant local currency GDP per
capita from World Development Indicators (WDI). The sample includes countries with 1970
GDP per capita less than or equal to USD 10,000 in year 2000 dollars.
long run behavior.
Figure 2 plots growth against the change in private net foreign assets, which is simply
total net foreign assets minus public net foreign assets. For the private sector, positive
growthisassociatedwithgreaternetcapitalinﬂowsonaverage(albeitweakly), consistent
with standard theory. Thus, the puzzle is one regarding government assets, the focus of
our model.4
Similarly, our paper addresses the issue of “global imbalances” as it relates to the inter-
action of developing economies with world ﬁnancial markets. An alternative explanation
to ours is that developing economies have incomplete domestic ﬁnancial markets and
therefore higher precautionary savings, which leads to capital outﬂows (see Willen, 2004
and Mendoza et al., 2008). However, this literature is silent on the heterogeneity across
developing economies in terms of capital ﬂows. For example, several Latin American
economies have similar or even more volatile business cycle than South Korea (Aguiar
and Gopinath, 2007) and less developed ﬁnancial markets (Rajan and Zingales, 1998),
4The public sector asset position is signiﬁcant when accounting for the total net foreign asset position of
countries. The correlation coefﬁcient between the level of total net foreign assets and the level of public net
foreign assets, normalized by GDP, is 0.90. The correlation is also high for ﬁrst differences: The coefﬁcient
on an OLS regression of the change in total net foreign assets on the change in the government’s foreign
asset position from 1970 to 2004 is 0.98.
5Turkey
Argentina Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia Costa Rica
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
El Salvador
Guatemala Honduras
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
Peru
Uruguay
Venezuela, RB
Jamaica
Egypt, Arab Rep. Sri Lanka
India
Indonesia Malaysia
Nepal
Pakistan
Philippines
Thailand
Algeria Cameroon
Chad
Gabon
Ghana
Cote d’Ivoire
Kenya
Madagascar
Mali
Morocco
Nigeria Rwanda
Senegal
Sudan
Swaziland
Togo
Tunisia
Zambia
 0.5 0 0.5 1
 2%
0%
2%
 4%
D(Privateassets/Y)
A
v
g
G
r
o
w
t
h
R
a
t
e
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
t
o
U
.
S
.
A
v
g
G
r
o
w
t
h
R
a
t
e
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
t
o
U
.
S
.
Figure 2: This ﬁgure plots average annual growth in real GDP per capita relative to the U.S.
against the change in the ration of private net foreign assets to GDP between 1970–2004. Pri-
vate net foreign assets are total net foreign assets (Net foreign assets are gross foreign assets
minus gross liabilities in current US dollars from EWN Mark II) minus public net foreign as-
sets(fromFigure1). RealGDPpercapitaisconstantlocalcurrencyGDPpercapitafromWorld
Development Indicators (WDI). The sample includes countries with 1970 GDP per capita less
than or equal to USD 10,000 in year 2000 dollars.
yet Latin America is not a strong exporter of capital (Figure 1). Caballero et al. (2008)
also emphasize ﬁnancial market weakness as generating capital outﬂows. In their model,
exogenous growth in developing economies generates wealth but not assets, requiring
external savings. Our model shares their focus on contracting frictions in developing
economies, but seeks to understand the underlying growth process. As noted above, our
paper shares the feature of Thomas and Worrall (1994) that reductions in debt support
larger capital stocks. Dooley et al. (2004) view this mechanism through the lens of a ﬁ-
nancial swap arrangement, and perform a quantitative exercise that rationalizes China’s
large foreign reserve position. These papers are silent on why some developing countries
accumulate collateral and some do not, a primary question of this paper. Our paper also
explores howthe underlying politicalenvironment affects thespeed with whichcountries
accumulate collateral or reduce debt.
A predominant explanation of the poor growth performance of developing countries
is that weak institutions in general and poor government policies in particular tend to
deter investment in capital and/or productivity enhancing technology.5 A literature has
5An important contribution in this regard is Parente and Prescott (2000). Similarly, a large literature links
differences in the quality of institutions to differences in income per capita, with a particular emphasis
on protections from governmental expropriation (for an inﬂuential series of papers along this line, see
Acemoglu et al., 2001, 2002 and Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005).
6developed that suggests that weak institutions generate capital outﬂows rather than in-
ﬂows (see, for example, Tornell and Velasco, 1992 and Alfaro et al., 2008, who address
the puzzle raised by Lucas, 1990). While it is no doubt true that world capital avoids
countries with weak property rights, our model rationalizes why countries with superior
economic performance are net exporters of capital. Our mechanism also endogenizes the
evolution of institutions – interpreted as respect for private capital – and the associated
growth path.
Our paper also relates to the literature on optimal government taxation with limited
commitment. Important papers in this literature are Benhabib and Rustichini (1997) and
Phelan and Stacchetti (2001), who share our focus on self-enforcing equilibria supported
by trigger strategies (a parallel literature has developed that focuses on Markov perfect
equilibria, such as Klein and Rios-Rull, 2003, Klein et al., 2005, and Klein et al., 2008).
In this literature, our paper is particularly related to Dominguez (2007), which shows in
the environment of Benhabib and Rustichini (1997) that a government will reduce it debt
in order to support the ﬁrst best capital in the long run (see also Reis, 2008). Recently,
Azzimonti (2009) has shown how political polarization and government impatience can
lead to high levels of investment taxes, slow growth and low levels of output per capita
in the context of a closed economy model with capital accumulation, partisan politics and
a restriction to Markov strategies. Differently from her work, we are focused on the open
economy implications of a political economy model. On the technical side, we analyze
trigger strategies and reputational equilibria, as we think these are important elements to
consider in any analysis of sovereign debt.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the environ-
ment. Section 3 characterizes the path of equilibrium taxes, investment, and output. Sec-
tion 4 discusses conditional convergence as it relates to the empirical growth literature,
and Section 5 concludes. The appendix features the following extensions of the model:
(i) introducing exogenous growth, (ii) allowing capitalists welfare to be in the objective
function of the incumbent governments, and (iii) allowing for a more general political
process. The appendix also contains all proofs.
2 Environment
In this section we describe the model environment (which is based on Aguiar et al., 2009).
Time is discrete and runs from 0 to inﬁnity. There is a small open economy which pro-
7duces a single good, whose world price is normalized to one. There is also an inter-
national ﬁnancial market that buys and sells risk-free bonds with a return denoted by
R = 1+ r.
The economy is populated by capitalists, who own and operate capital, workers who
provide labor, and a government. In our benchmark analysis, we assume that capital-
ists do not enter the government’s objective function, deﬁned below. This assumption is
convenient in that the government has no hard-wired qualms about expropriating capital
income and transferring it to its preferred constituency. This assumption is not crucial to
the results and we discuss the more general case with “insider” capitalists in Appendix B.
The important assumption is that capitalists operate a technology otherwise unavailable
to the government and are under the threat of expropriation.
2.1 Firms
Domestic ﬁrms use capital together with labor to produce according to a strictly concave,
constant returns to scale production function f(k,l).6 We assume that f(k,l) satisﬁes the
usual Inada conditions. Capital is fully mobile internationally at the beginning of every
period,7 but after invested is sunk for one period. Capital depreciates at a rate d.
Labor is hired by the ﬁrms in a competitive domestic labor market which clears at
an equilibrium wage wt. The government taxes the ﬁrm proﬁts at a rate tt. Let p =
f(k,l)   wl denote per capita proﬁts before taxes and depreciation, and so (1   t)p is
after-tax proﬁts. The ﬁrm rents capital at the rate r + d. Given an equilibrium path of
wages and capital taxes, proﬁt maximizing behavior of the representative ﬁrm implies:
(1  tt)fk(kt,lt) = r + d (1)
fl(kt,lt) = wt. (2)
For future reference, we denote k? as the ﬁrst best capital given a mass one of labor:
fk(k?,1) = r + d. When convenient in what follows, we will drop the second argument
and simply denote production f(k).
6The model focuses on transitional dynamics and assumes a constant technology for convenience. The
model easily accommodates exogenous technical progress in which the steady state is a balanced growth
path. See Appendix A for details.
7That is capital will earn the same after tax return in the small open economy as in the international
ﬁnancial markets. See Caselli and Feyrer (2007) on evidence that returns to capital are quantitatively very
similar across countries.
8It is convenient to limit the government’s maximal tax rate to ¯ t > 0. We assume that
this constraint does not bind along the equilibrium path. Nevertheless, as discussed in
Section 2.5, this assumption allows us to characterize possible allocations off the equilib-
rium path.
2.2 Domestic workers, capitalists and the government
Labor is supplied inelastically each period by a measure-one continuum of domestic
workers (there is no international mobility of labor). The representative domestic work-
ers enjoys utility ﬂows over per capita consumption, u(c). Domestic workers discount
the future with a discount factor b 2 (0,1/R]. The representative agent’s utility is
¥
å
t=0
btu(ct). (3)
with u0 > 0,u00  0, and where we normalize u(0)  0.
We assume that domestic workers have no direct access to international capital mar-
kets. In particular, we assume that the government can control the consumption/savings
decisions of its constituents using lump sum transfers and time varying taxes or subsidies
on domestic savings. This is equivalent in our set up to workers consuming their wages
plus a transfer: ct = wt + Tt, where Tt is the transfer from the government.8
The government every period receives the income from the tax on proﬁts and transfers
resources to the workers subject to its budget constraint:
ttpt + bt+1 = Rbt + Tt (4)
where bt is debt due in period t. The government and workers combined resource con-
straint is therefore:
ct + Rbt = bt+1 + tpt + wt. (5)
Note thatoutput isdeterministic, andso a single, risk-free bondtraded withthe rest ofthe
world is sufﬁcient to insure the economy. However, as described in the next subsection,
political incumbents face a risk of losing ofﬁce, and this risk is not insurable. The fact
that sovereign debt is not contingent on individual leader’s political fortunes is a realistic
assumption. We leave the question of how debt contingent on political outcomes affects
8This can be decentralized by consumers having access to a tax distorted bond.
9dynamics for future research.
2.3 Political Environment
There is a set I  f1,2,..., Ng of political parties, where N is the number of parties. At
any time, the government is under the control of an incumbent party that is chosen at the
beginning of every period from set I. As described below, an incumbent party may lose
(and regain) power over time. Our fundamental assumption is that the incumbent strictly
prefers consumption to occur while in power:
Assumption 1 (Political Economy Friction). A party enjoys a utility ﬂow ˜ qu(c) when in power
and a utility ﬂow u(c) when not in power, where c is per capita consumption by the domestic
workers and where ˜ q > 1.
The parameter ˜ q parameterizes the extra marginal utility beneﬁts that a party extracts
from expenditures when in power. One motivation for this parameter is political dis-
agreement regarding the type of expenditures, as in, for example, the classic paper of
Alesina and Tabellini (1990). Speciﬁcally, suppose that the incumbent party selects the at-
tributes of a public good that forms the basis of private consumption. If parties disagree
about the desirable attributes of the consumption good, the utility stemming from a given
level of spending will be greater for the party in power. We model such disagreement in
a simple, reduced form way with the parameter ˜ q.9 Alternatively, we can think of the
incumbent capturing a disproportionate share of per capita consumption.10
The transfer of power is modeled as an exogenous Markov process. The fact that the
transfer of power is exogenous can be considered a constraint on political contracts be-
tween the population (or other parties) and the incumbent. As will be clear, each incum-
bent will abide by the constrained efﬁcient tax plan along the equilibrium path. However,
doing so does not guarantee continued incumbency (although our results easily extend
to the case where the incumbent loses ofﬁce for sure if it deviates). That is, following the
prescribed tax and debt plan does not rule out that other factors may lead to a change
of government. We capture this with a simple parametrization that nests perpetual of-
ﬁce holding, hard term limits, and the probabilistic voting model. Our benchmark case
9See Battaglini and Coate (2008) for a recent paper that incorporates pork-barrel spending in a dynamic
model of ﬁscal policy. They obtain a reduced form representation that is similar to ours, except that ˜ q is also
a function of the state of the economy.
10Suppose that when in power, a party receives a higher share f of c. Then, the marginal utility when in
power is u0(fc)f, and our assumption would be similar to requiring that this marginal utility be increasing
in f.
10is when the probability of a party being in power at any time is given by p = 1/N, and
independent of the history. 11
Given a deterministic path of consumption, the utility of the incumbent in period t
can now be expressed as:
˜ Wt = ˜ qu(ct) +
¥
å
s=t+1
bs t(p˜ q + 1  p)u(cs). (6)
Note that the incumbent discounts the future at the private agents’ discount factor b,
but incumbency implies that it discounts between the current and next period at the rate
b(p˜ q + 1   p)/˜ q < b. That is, for a deterministic path of consumption, the incumbent’s
objective is equivalent to a quasi-hyperbolic agent as in Laibson (1997) (the fact that po-
litical turnover can induce hyperbolic preferences for political incumbents was explored
by Amador, 2004). This framework is rich enough to capture several cases. A situation
where the country is ruled by a “dictator for life” who has no altruism for successive
generations, can be analyzed by letting ˜ q ! ¥, reﬂecting the zero weight the dictator
puts on aggregate consumption once it is out of power. Letting ˜ q ! 1, the government is
benevolent and the political friction disappears.
We simplify the expression for the government’s value function by introducing a se-
quence of ﬁctitious “stand-in” governments, each of which is in power one period and
has a value function Wt proportional to ˜ Wt. Speciﬁcally, we can normalize the govern-
ment’s value function (6) by the constant p˜ q +1  p. As will be clear below, the scaling of
the incumbent’s utility has no effect on the equilibrium allocations, and so we work with
Wt. In particular,
Wt =
˜ Wt
(p˜ q + 1  p)
= qu(ct) +
¥
å
s=t+1
bs tu(cs)
= qu(ct) + bVt+1, (7)
where Vt is the value function of private agents and q 
˜ q
p˜ q+1 p. Note that q is increasing
in ˜ q, but is decreasing in p. That is, a lower probability of retaining ofﬁce or more political
parties increase political disagreement from the perspective of our stand-in government.
11The more general case in which an incumbent has a higher probability of retaining ofﬁce is treated in
Appendix C. The main results presented below extend to the more general political process. The appendix
also discusses new results that arise when incumbency is persistent.
112.4 Equilibrium Concept
The ﬁnal key feature of the environment concerns the government’s lack of commitment.
Speciﬁcally, tax policies and debt payments for any period represent promises that can
be broken by the government. Given the one-period irreversibility of capital, there exists
the possibility that the government can seize capital or capital income. Moreover, the
government can decide not to make promised debt payments in any period.
We consider self-enforcing equilibria that are supported by a “punishment” equilib-
rium. Speciﬁcally, let W(k) denote the payoff to the incumbent government after a de-
viation when capital is k, which we characterize in the next subsection. Self-enforcing
implies that:
Wt  W(kt),8t, (8)
where Wt is given by (7).
Our equilibrium concept assumes that political risk is not insurable. That is, sovereign
debt or tax promises cannot be made contingent on the realization of the party in power,
which we take as a realistic assumption.12 We therefore look for equilibria under the
following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 1. A self-enforcing deterministic equilibrium is a deterministic sequence of con-
sumption, capital, debt, tax rates and wages fct,kt,bt,tt,wtg, with tt  ¯ t for all t and such that
(i) ﬁrms maximize proﬁts given taxes and wages; (ii) the labor market clears; (iii) the resource
constraint (5) and the associated no Ponzi condition hold given some initial debt b0; and (iv) the
participation constraint (8) holds given deviation payoffs W(kt).
2.5 The punishment and the deviation payoff
For simplicity we deﬁned the equilibrium conditional on deviation payoffs W(k). To-
wards obtaining this punishment payoffs, we assume that after any deviation from the
equilibrium allocation, the international ﬁnancial markets shut down access to credit and
assets forever.
Given that the country has no access to borrowing nor savings after a deviation, we
12That is, foreigners contract with governments, not individual parties. One way to rationalize the ab-
sence of political insurance is to assume that foreign creditors cannot distinguish among the various do-
mestic political parties (or factions within a party, and so on). International ﬁnancial assets therefore cannot
make promises contingent on political outcomes.
12construct a punishment equilibrium of the game between investors and the government
thathasthefollowingstrategies. Foranyhistoryfollowingadeviation, thepartyinpower
sets the tax rate at its maximum ¯ t, and investors invest k, where k solves:
(1  ¯ t)f 0(k) = r + d,
where k = 0 if ¯ t  1. These strategies form an equilibrium. A party in power today
cannot gain by deviating to a different tax rate, given that it is already taxing at the max-
imum rate and reducing taxes does not increase future investment. On the other hand,
investors understand that they will be taxed at the maximum rate, and thus invest up to
the point of indifference.
The following lemma establishes that the above equilibrium is the harshest punish-
ment:
Lemma 1. The continuation equilibrium where tt = ¯ t after any history and the country is in
ﬁnancial autarky generates the lowest utility to the incumbent party of any self-enforcing equilib-
rium.
Inanyself-enforcingequilibrium, oncetheinvestorshaveinvested k inthecountry, the
party in power could deviate from the equilibrium path by choosing a different tax rate
or by changing the equilibrium path of debt issuance. Such a deviation triggers ﬁnancial
autarky and the lowest possible investment. If the party in power where to deviate, it will
ﬁnd optimal to tax current k at the maximum possible rate, and its deviating payoff will
be given by W(k):
W(k) = qu(¯ c(k)) +
b
1  b
u(¯ c(k)), (9)
where ¯ c(k) = f(k)   (1  ¯ t)f 0(k)k.
3 Efﬁcient Allocations
There are in principle multiple equilibria of this economy. In this section we solve for the
self-enforcing deterministic equilibrium that maximizes the utility of the population as of
time 0 given an initial level of debt. That is, the population chooses its preferred ﬁscal
policy subject to ensuring the cooperation of all future governments, which is a natural
13benchmark.13
Weassumefortherestofthepaperthatthesmallopeneconomyisatleastasimpatient
as the foreigners:
Assumption 2. The parameters are such that bR  1.
This assumption guarantees that the government of the small open economy does not
accumulate assets to inﬁnity. It is also the relevant empirical case. For example, bR = 1
obtains if the world behaves as a neoclassical growth model, is at a steady state, and
domestic agents are as patient as foreigners. The restriction that bR < 1 for a small
open economy is commonly used in quantitative sovereign debt models (see for example,
Aguiar and Gopinath, 2006 and Arellano, forthcoming).
As it is standard in the Ramsey taxation literature, we ﬁrst show that we can restrict
attention to allocations, that is, a sequence of consumption and capital: fct,ktg. To see
this note that conditions (i), (ii) and (iii) of Deﬁnition 1 can be collapsed to a present value
condition:
b0 
¥
å
t=0
R t(f(kt)   (r + d)kt   ct)
Importantly, for any allocation fct,ktg that satisﬁes the above present value condition and
kt  k, there exist a tax rate sequence ftt  ¯ tg, a wage sequence fwtg, and a debt position
fbtg such that fct,kt,bt,tt,wtg is a competitive equilibrium (satisﬁes (i), (ii) and (iii)). That
is, if an allocation satisﬁes the present value condition and also satisﬁes the participation
constraint (8), then it is a self enforcing deterministic equilibrium.
We can then obtain the equilibrium allocation that maximizes the utility of the popu-
lation at time zero, given an initial stock of debt b0, by solving:
V(b0) = max
fct,ktg
¥
å
t=0
btu(ct) (P)
13An alternative equilibria is one in which the initial government selects the best self-enforcing ﬁscal
policy from its perspective, where “initial” could be interpreted as the time the economy opens itself to
capital ﬂows. This equilibrium has the same dynamics as the one we study in the next subsection, starting
from the second period.
14subject to:
b0 
¥
å
t=0
R t (f(kt)   (r + d)kt   ct), (10)
W(kt)  qu(ct) + b
¥
å
s=t+1
bs t 1u(cs), 8t (11)
k  kt (12)
The ﬁrst constraint is the present value condition discussed previously; the second con-
straint is the participation constraint for the sequence of incumbents; and the last con-
straint, (12), guarantees that ¯ t  tt. Unless stated otherwise, in what follows we assume
that this last constraint does not bind along the equilibrium path.14
Let m0 be the multiplier on the budget constraint (10) and R tm0ht/q be the multiplier
on the sequence of constraints on participation (11). The necessary ﬁrst order condition
for the optimality of consumption is:
1 = u0(ct)
 
btRt
m0 |{z}
impatience
+
t
å
s=0
bsRsht s
q
| {z }
limited commitment
+

q   1
q

ht
| {z }
disagreement
!
, 8t  0. (13)
Thisﬁrstorderconditionforconsumption(13)hasthreeterms. Theﬁrstterm, (bR)t/m0,
is the standard consumption tilting: agents prefer to delay, smooth, or bring forward con-
sumption depending on whether bR T 1. The second term, å
t
s=0(bR)s ht s
q , reﬂects the
fact that raising consumption in period t relaxes the participation constraints for peri-
ods t   s < t as well. This term highlights the efﬁciency of back-loading payments in
one-sided limited commitment models: when bR = 1, this term is monotone and increas-
ing in t, and thus will lead to an increasing path of consumption. Political disagreement
however, introduces one new term: (q   1)
ht
q . This term tells us that the current period
is special, as an increase in utility at time t relaxes the current incumbent’s participation
constraint by an extra (q   1).
The necessary condition for the optimality of the capital stock is:
ht
q
W0(kt) = f 0(kt)   (r + d), 8t  0 (14)
The lack of commitment is also evident in this condition, when coupled with the ﬁrms’
14In the appendix we described the general solution taking into account that this constraint may bind.
15ﬁrst order condition. Note that absent commitment problems (ht = 0), capital would be
at the ﬁrst best, as taxing capital in this model is inefﬁcient ex-ante. However, under lack
of commitment, a zero tax may not be self-enforcing. When the participation constraint
on the incumbent government is binding (ht > 0), then f 0(kt) > r + d and so the tax on
capital is strictly positive. Nevertheless, the necessary conditions imply that t = 0 will
be sustained in the long run if private agents discount at the world interest rate:
Proposition 1. If bR = 1 and q < ¥, then kt ! k.
The proof of this proposition (see Appendix D) relies on the fact that each time the
participation constraint binds, ht > 0 and we add a strictly positive term to the sum on
the right hand side of (13). This generates a force for increasing consumption over time,
which relaxes the government’s participation constraint. There is a potentially counter-
vailing force in that the current ht is weighted by more than the past, as q > 1. However,
eventually the (inﬁnite) sum dominates and consumption levels off at a point such that
participation no longer binds at k?.
Asdiscussedabove, ageneralfeatureofmodelswithone-sidedlimitedcommitmentis
that the optimal contract “back loads” incentives when agents are patient (see, for exam-
ple, Ray, 2002). However, if the agent that suffers from lack of commitment is impatient,
this is not necessarily the case. For example, in the models of Aguiar et al. (2009) and Ace-
moglu et al. (2008), governmental impatience prevents the ﬁrst best level of investment
from being achieved in the long run. In our environment, we approach this ﬁrst best level
despite the fact that the incumbent government, which chooses the tax rate at every pe-
riod, is discounting between today and tomorrow at a higher rate than that of the private
agents. However, the critical point is that each incumbent discounts the future periods at
the same rate b = 1/R. For this reason, each government is willing to support a path of
investment that approaches the ﬁrst best. This highlights that short term impatience of
the incumbents is not sufﬁcient to generate distortions in the long-run.
Another interesting feature of the model is that ﬁnancial openness always beneﬁts the
population in our chosen equilibrium. Financial openness expands the budget set relative
to continued ﬁnancial autarky, starting from zero external debt. Moreover, because devia-
tion leads to ﬁnancial autarky, no other constraint is affected. It immediately follows that
ﬁnancial openness, all else equal, will (weakly) raise the welfare of the population (or the
initial decision maker). Note that in our model, the beneﬁts of ﬁnancial openness are not
just generated from a faster transition, as in the neoclassical growth model, but may also
arise from the ability to sustain a different and better steady state due to the accumula-
16tion of net foreign assets. The welfare gains from openness may therefore be higher than
the transitional gains in the neoclassical growth model, which are quantitatively small as
emphasized by Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006).
3.1 Linear Utility
In this subsection, we study the case of linear utility, u0(c) = 1, for which we can solve
for the equilibrium dynamics in closed form. Although an extreme case, the intuition of
the linear case carries over to the concave case studied next. For what follows, we will
ignore the non-negativity constraint on consumption (or else, the reader can assume that
the analysis is in the neighborhood of the steady state of the economy, which will turn
out to feature positive consumption levels).
In the case of linear utility, the ﬁrst order condition for consumption becomes:
1 =
btRt
m0
+
t
å
s=0
bsRsht s
q
+

q   1
q

ht, 8t  0 (15)
The initial period h0 is therefore h0 = 1   m 1
0 . As m0 is the multiplier on b0, more debt
in period 0 is associated (weakly) with a larger m0 and a larger h0. As can be seen, the
multiplier on the resource constraint cannot be smaller than 1, which implies from the
associated envelope condition that V0(b0) =  m0   1. This is intuitive as  1 is the efﬁ-
cient rate of resource transfers between the small open economy and the foreigners in the
absence of a binding participation constraint (in an interior solution). The binding partic-
ipation constraints distort this rate, making it increasingly costly to transfer resources to
the foreigners as b0 increases.
Equation (15) pins down the dynamics of ht, the multiplier on the government’s par-
ticipation constraint. The dynamics of kt can be recovered from ht through the ﬁrst order
condition for capital (14), which states: ht = q(f 0(kt)   r   d)/W0(kt). The second order
conditions require that, in the neighborhood of the optimum, the latter term is decreasing
in kt. We strengthen this by assuming that this holds globally:
Assumption 3 (Convexity).
f0(kt) r d
W0(kt) is decreasing in k for all k 2 [k,k?].
In the linear case, this holds under mild assumptions.15 This assumption will also always
15For linear utility, sufﬁcient conditions are that ¯ t = 1, or that the curvature of the production function,
 
f00(k)k
f0(k) , be non decreasing in k. The latter is satisﬁed for the usual Cobb-Douglas production function.
17be satisﬁed for concave utility in the neighborhood of k?. Note that this assumption also
ensures that the constraint set in problem (P) is convex, so conditions (13) and (14) are
necessary and sufﬁcient.16 With this assumption in hand, we can explore the dynamics
of k by studying h, as k is now monotonically (and inversely) related to h. In the same
way, the dynamics of capital taxation are mapped monotonically into the the dynamics
of h. A particularly convenient benchmark in the linear utility case is ¯ t = 1. In this case,
tt = ht, so the tax rate is just equal to the multiplier on participation.17 More generally,
monotone convergence of ht implies monotone convergence of kt and of the tax rates that
decentralize it.
We now characterize the dynamics of ht:
Proposition 2 (Linear Dynamics). The multiplier ht that solves (15) satisﬁes the following
difference equation:
ht+1 = 1  bR + bR

1 
1
q

ht , 8t  0 (16)
with h0 = 1   m 1
0 and m0  1. The sequence of ht converges monotonically towards its steady
state value h¥:
h¥ =
q(1  bR)
q(1  bR) + bR
.
The convergence of ht implies that the sequence of kt converges to a steady state. De-
ﬁne ¯ q to be such that ¯ q(1  bR)/(¯ q(1  bR) + bR) = (f 0(k)   (r + d))/¯ c0(k). Then,
Corollary 1 (Monotone Convergence). The sequence of capital, kt, converges monotonically to
its steady state level of capital, k¥. The value of k¥ solves
f 0(k¥)   (r + d)
¯ c0(k¥)
=
q(1  bR)
q(1  bR) + bR
(17)
16To see that Assumption 3 implies convexity of the planning problem, make the following change of
variables in problem P: let ht = W(kt) be our choice variable instead of capital, and deﬁne K(W(k)) = k
to be the inverse of W(k). Similarly, we make utility itself the choice variable and let c(u) denote the
inverse utility function, that is, the consumption required to deliver the speciﬁed utility. In this way, the
objective function and constraint (11) are linear in the choice variables. The budget constraint is convex if
f(K(h))   (r + d)K(h) is concave in h, which is the same requirement as Assumption 3.
17To see this, note form (9) that if ¯ t = 1 we have W0(k) = qf0(k). The ﬁrst order condition for capital then
implies that ht = 1  (r + d)/f0(k). The fact that (1  t)f0(k) = r + d then gives h = t.
18as long as q  ¯ q, and equals k otherwise.18,19 If country A starts with a higher sovereign debt
level than country B, then all else equal, the path of capital for country A will be (weakly) lower
than that for country B.
Note that the value k¥ is decreasing in q as long as bR < 1 and q  ¯ q. That is,
more disagreement when coupled with impatience leads to lower steady state levels of
investment.
From the fact that h0 = 1   m 1
0 , whether the government’s participation constraint
binds in the initial period depends on m0, which is the multiplier on initial debt. If the
economy starts off with low enough debt (or high enough assets), it can support k? in
the initial period. If bR = 1, from (16), it will stay at the ﬁrst best thereafter. However,
if initial debt is such that the ﬁrst best is not sustainable immediately, then the economy
will have non-trivial dynamics. Similarly, if bR < 1, then (16) implies that ht > 0 for
t > 0 regardless of initial debt, as consumption is front loaded due to impatience. In
short, other than the case of patient agents starting off at the ﬁrst best, the economy will
experience non-trivial dynamics as it converges to the steady state. For the remainder of
the analysis, we assume this is the case.
Figure 3 shows the transition mapping of ht. The diagram describes a situation where
bR < 1. Note that the speed of convergence in the neighborhood of the steady state
is ﬁnite, and given by  ln[bR(1  1/q)]. Note as well that when q = 1, the speed of
convergence is inﬁnite.
Now that we have solved for the dynamics of h and k, we turn to the dynamics of debt.
The sequence of binding participation constraints, Wt = W(kt) map the dynamics of cap-
ital into that of incumbent utility, given that W(k) is strictly increasing in k. Therefore, Wt
also monotonically approaches its steady state value. We now show that the information
contained in the inﬁnite sequence of incumbent utility values is sufﬁcient to recover the
utility of the population at any time:
Lemma 2. The utility to the population as of time t, Vt = å
¥
s=0 bsct+s, is given by:
Vt =
1
q
¥
å
s=0
bs

1 
1
q
s
Wt.
18Recall that we have assumed that kt > k along the equilibrium path. That is, the constraint tt  ¯ t does
not bind. If
q(1 bR)
q(1 bR)+bR >
f0(k) (r+d)
¯ c0(k) , or ¯ q < q, then the constraint will for sure bind as t ! ¥. In this
case, k¥ achieves the lower bound of k and further increases in q do not affect k¥. See the appendix for a
complete treatment.
19Note that ¯ q is inﬁnity when ¯ t = 1.
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Figure 3: Transition mapping for ht when bR < 1. The blue line in the diagram represents
the transition mapping as given by equation (16). The dashed line represents a possible equi-
librium path for initial condition h0.
Given that the values kt are monotonic and that Wt = W(k) is an increasing function
of k, it follows that:
Proposition 3. The utility to of the population, Vt, converges monotonically to its steady state
value. The sequence of values Vt is increasing (decreasing) if and only if the sequence of kt is
increasing (decreasing).
We have now shown that the discounted utility of the population and the sequence
of incumbent utility move monotonically in the same direction towards their respective
steady states. Given that Wt and Vt increase monotonically, it follows that outstanding
sovereign debt decreases monotonically:
Corollary 2. The stock of the economy’s outstanding sovereign debt decreases (increases) mono-
tonically to its steady state value if the sequence of kt is increasing (decreasing).
The above corollary closes the loop between growth and debt and brings us back to
our original motivation. It states, quite generally, that capital accumulation will be ac-
companied with a reduction in the external debt of the government. Similarly, a country
that shrinks, does so while their government accumulates sovereign liabilities.
203.1.1 Interpreting the Results
The political economy frictions are at play when q > 1. As long as private agents are
impatient, (17) implies that increased disagreement (higher q) leads to a decline in steady
state capital. In this situation, political economy considerations exacerbate the relative
impatience of private agents. Moreover, from (16) we see that q > 1 introduces transi-
tional dynamics, and the greater is q the slower the rate of convergence, which is given
by  ln[bR(1  1/q)]. To the extent that political disagreement varies across countries,
we will have heterogeneity in growth rates, and, if bR < 1, in steady states as well. This
addresses the question posed in the introduction regarding cross-country differences in
growth rates observed in the data.
We now provide some intuition for why q governs the rate of convergence and why
there are any dynamics at all in an environment where absent political economy frictions,
the economy jumps immediately to its steady state.
To simplify the discussion, let’s consider the case where bR = 1. Note ﬁrst that in an
optimal solution, Wt = W(kt). Using bR = 1, the resource constraint (10) can be rewritten
as:
b0 
¥
å
t=0
R t
"
f(kt)   (r + d)kt  
1
q

1 
1
q
t
W(kt)
#
The right hand side is the amount of income paid to foreign lenders, which will equal
the amount of debt owed in equilibrium. To see the trade-offs inherent in increasing k,
consider the maximum amount of debt that can be repaid in equilibrium. That is, the
allocation that corresponds to the equilibrium starting from the maximum debt level.
That allocation’s sequence of kt solves:
max
fktg
¥
å
t=0
R t
"
f(kt)   (r + d)kt  
1
q

1 
1
q
t
W(kt)
#
As can be seen from this problem, one can decompose the choice of the optimal kt in
two parts. The ﬁrst, f(kt)   (r + d)kt captures the income generated from investing kt.
The second, 1
q

1  1
q
t
W(kt), behaves as a cost of choosing a given kt. This cost arises
because the binding participation constraints imply that, to increase kt, resources will
have to be transferred to the party in power. Transitional dynamics appear because this
cost is strictly decreasing over time, as long as q > 1, which leads to an optimal path for
21the capital stock that increases monotonically to its steady state.
This raises the question of why the cost of sustaining kt is decreasing with time. The
answer lies in the provision of incentives to incumbents and their continuing disagree-
ment about the timing of expenditures. To see this, suppose that one would like to in-
crease the capital at some time t, and to achieve this, consumption at time t must be
increased by one unit to satisfy the participation constraint. This increase in consumption
at time t is costly, but can be compensated with a decrease in consumption at t   1, given
that the utility of the incumbent at t   1 has increased by b. Thus, to keep the incumbent
at t   1 indifferent, consumption at t   1 can be lowered by  b/q. So far, the total cost of
increasing kt is thus b   b/q, or:
b

1 
1
q

However, as a consequence of the ongoing disagreement about the timing of expendi-
tures, the changes in the consumption allocation also affect the utility of the incumbent
at time t   2. Because consumption at time t increases, while consumption at time t   1
decreases so as to leave the incumbent at time t   1 indifferent, the disagreement im-
plies that the utility of the incumbent at time t   2 has increased, by an amount equal
to b2

1  1
q

> 0. Consumption at time t   2 can correspondingly be decreased by
b2
q

1  1
q

. So now, the total cost of increasing kt is b2

1  1
q

 
b2
q

1  1
q

, or:
b

1 
1
q
2
Similarly, because consumption at time t   2 decreased so as to leave the incumbent at
time t   2 indifferent, the disagreement again implies that the incumbent at time t   3
now has a higher utility. And thus, consumption at time t   3 can be lowered, reducing
the total cost of increasing k to b

1  1
q
3
. This can be repeated in a similar fashion for all
previous periods, and as long as the disagreement is always present across incumbents, the total
cost of increasing kt in period t is decreasing in the number of previous incumbents, generating
the dynamics in the path of capital.
One can also see that when there is no disagreement (q = 1), convergence is immedi-
ate.20 More generally, note that the higher the disagreement (that is, the higher the q) the
20The linear case in standard models of expropriation has been studied in detail by Thomas and Worrall
(1994) and Alburquerque and Hopenhayn (2004) for bR = 1. In those papers, non-trivial transition dynam-
ics are generated because of the binding requirement that consumption must be positive. The results here
22slower the decline in costs and the longer it takes to converge to the steady state.
The above exercise also points to the difference between q and the discount factor b. A
value of q > 1, makes parties short term impatient, and creates continuous disagreement
about the timing of expenditures, making the optimal allocation dynamic. A value of
b < 1/R, also makes the incumbents more impatient, but as long as q = 1, this impatience
does not create disagreement, and no dynamics are generated. Moreover, we see from
Proposition 2 that impatience (a low b) speeds convergence to the steady state. If agents
are impatient, there is little disagreement across incumbents about spending far in the
future, even if delayed spending is compounded at the market interest rate. In this sense,
impatience limits the amount of disagreement, speeding convergence to the steady state.
Perhaps the dichotomy between impatience and disagreement is starkest when the
economy is shrinking. This will be the case if the economy starts with low enough debt
and bR < 1 (that is, the economy starts to the left of h¥ in Figure 3). A low b economy
(holding q constant) will collapse relatively quickly to a low steady state. Conversely, a
high q economy (holding b < 1/(1 + r) constant) will experience a relatively long, slow
decline.
The case of a shrinking economy also highlights the distinction between our model
and one with a simple borrowing constraint. Borrowing constraints do not induce dy-
namics if capital starts above its steady state level. However, our model has non-trivial
dynamics whether the economy is growing or shrinking.
3.1.2 Steady States of Debt and Consumption
In this section we continue our characterization and solve for the steady state consump-
tion and debt. For that, we use the fact that W¥ = W(k¥), and so
c¥ =
W(k¥)
q +
b
1 b
=
q¯ c(k¥) +
b
1 b ¯ c(k)
q +
b
1 b
> 0. (18)
make clear that the speed of convergence around the steady state in these models is inﬁnity (independently
of whether bR is equal to or less than one), and also that these linear economies will immediately converge
if they start with sufﬁciently low debt. It is possible to generate smoother dynamics in the above models by
introducing risk aversion. However in Section 3.2 we argue that numerically, for the neoclassical growth
model and standard parameter values, the speed of convergence is determined primarily by q even in the
presence of risk aversion.
23This conﬁrms our underlying assumption that in the neighborhood of the steady state
consumption is positive, and thus, the non-negativity constraint can be ignored.
The steady state level of debt then follows from the fact that debt equals the present
discounted value of net payments to the foreign ﬁnancial markets:
B¥ =

1+ r
r

(f(k¥)   (r + d)k¥   c¥). (19)
The case of bR = 1 provides a clear example of the impact of political economy on
steady state debt. For this discount factor, the steady state capital is k? regardless of q 2
[1,¥); that is, ¶k¥/¶q = 0. Therefore, ¶B¥/¶q =  

1+r
r

¶c¥/¶q, and this expression is
negative from (18). We thus have the following proposition:
Proposition 4. Suppose bR = 1. Then steady state consumption is increasing and steady state
debt is decreasing in q 2 [1,¥).
Proposition 4 states that when private agents discount at the world interest rate an
increase in political disagreement reduces debt levels in the steady state. That is, a country
with larger political frictions has a smaller amount of debt in the long run. The intuition
for this result follows from the fact that when bR = 1 the optimal allocation follows a
path that leads to ﬁrst best capital in the long run. However, to sustain this ﬁrst best
capital, a government with a higher q must have a lower debt, or else it will deviate and
expropriate the capital.
While Proposition 4 states that debt will be lower in the steady state for countries
with greater political disagreements when bR = 1, this does not imply that debt will
be negatively correlated with disagreement in a cross-section of countries. This does not
follow for two reasons. The ﬁrst is that countries with a large q converge very slowly
to the steady state, with convergence being arbitrarily slow as q ! ¥. That is, while
polarized countries may be heading to a steady state in which debt is low, it will take
a very long time to arrive there. Therefore, at any moment in time, countries will be at
different points on their transition paths, and the steady state comparative statics are not
sufﬁcient to sign the cross-sectional correlation.
Moreover, the result depends on bR = 1 and does not hold for all b. If agents in
developing countries are impatient relative to the world interest rate, k¥ declines with q,
as well as c¥, making the net effect of q on B¥ ambiguous. In fact, if bR < 1, then ¶B¥/¶q
canhaveeithersign, dependingon b. Forexample, supposethat ¯ t < 1, so k > 0. Forlarge
24enough q, the upper bound on taxes will bind in the long run, as stated in Proposition 2.
Increases in q above ¯ q do not lead to lower capital in the long run given the bound on tax
rates. In this case, the effect of q on debt once again becomes unambiguous:
Proposition 5. Let bR < 1, and ¯ t < 1 (so that ¯ q < ¥). Then, the following two statements
hold:
lim
q!¯ q
B¥ = 0, and lim
q!¯ q 
dB¥
dq
> 0.
Given that f(k¥) > 0 for all q, then these statements imply that the debt to output ratio must
increase in q for sufﬁciently high q when bR < 1 and ¯ t < 1.
Similarly, if bR < 1, whether the capital stock converges to its steady state from above
or below is ambiguous. That is, if bR = 1, then the fact that k1 < k? = k¥ implies that
the country unambiguously converges to the steady state from below for all q 2 (1,¥).
However, if bR < 1, convergence may be from above, with capital falling over time and
debt increasing.
3.1.3 Aid without Conditionality and Debt Forgiveness
Before concluding this section, we will use the model to discuss the role of two policies:
foreign aid and debt forgiveness. Our set up delivers a laboratory that allows us to ask
whethertheintroductionofforeignaidanddebtreliefchangesthepathofinvestmentand
growth. Although, similar in principle (they both represent a transfer from foreigners
to the domestic agents), these two policies will end up having different effects on the
behavior of the economy.
From our previous analysis, we see that debt forgiveness, as given by a reduction in
b0, will affect the economy in the short run, but will not affect the steady state levels of
investment and debt. That is, if b0 is reduced, then from Corollary 1, we know that the
resulting path of capital will be higher, but the long run level of debt, capital, and output
will not change as the economy converges to the same steady state.21 The transitory
effect of debt relief is relevant to recent experience in Africa. As Western donor countries
consider debt forgiveness, the debtor African countries are simultaneously seeking new
21This is consistent with the empirical effect of debt relief on domestic stock market values, investment,
and short run GDP growth rates. For a recent survey of the literature see Arslanalp and Henry (2006)
25loans from China.22
Another common policy aimed at helping developing countries is foreign aid. Among
the different emerging market economies, several have received signiﬁcant amounts of
aid from abroad. In the data, however, the relationship between aid and growth seems, if
anything, insigniﬁcant.23
With that goal in mind, let an aid sequence fytg¥
t=0 be a sequence of non-negative
values yt denoting for all times t, the amount of aid provided to the government by un-
speciﬁed foreign benefactors. The aid sequence is deterministic and non-contingent, that
is, there is no conditionality. Importantly, this implies that the autarky values is now
given by the following:
W(kt) = q(¯ c(kt) + yt) +
¥
å
i=1
bi(¯ c(k) + yt+i)
for all t. The present value constraint on the resources of the government is:
b0 
¥
å
t=0
R t(f(kt) + yt   (r + d)kt   ct)
Then, the following holds:
Proposition 6. Let fktg¥
t=0 be the optimal sequence of capital that solves the population’s problem
as of time t = 0 without the presence of aid. Then fktg¥
t=0 is also an optimal sequence of capital of
the economy with an aid sequence fytg¥
t=0.
Aid without conditionality improves the utility of the population, as it represents a
transfer that will be consumed by them. However, it does not affect the capital accumu-
lation patterns of the country, not even in the short run.24
22See, for example, the Financial Times article “Donors press Congo over $9bn China deal” on February
9 of 2009.
23See the original article by Burnside and Dollar (2000), Easterly (2003) for a survey, and Rajan and Sub-
ramanian (2008) for a more recent analysis.
24Note that we consider aid that is not conditional on ﬁscal policy. Conditional aid may relax the partic-
ipation constraint and therefore alter investment. See Scholl (2009) for a study of aid and conditionality in
an environment with limited commitment.
263.2 Concave Utility
Thelinearutilitycaseprovidessimpleanalyticalexpressionsforthedynamicsoftheecon-
omy that make clear why the transition is slow and how this transition is affected by the
parameters of interest. However, linear utility is an extreme assumption and begs the
question of whether the insights gleaned from the linear case are robust to more realistic
utility functions. To answer this question, we explore the dynamics around the steady
state for concave utility.
To simplify expressions, we consider the dynamics of ut = u(ct) rather than ct, and let
c(u) denote the inverse utility function. The dynamics of the economy are characterized
by the following four equations:
c0(ut)   bRc0(ut 1) = ht   bR

q   1
q

ht 1 (20)
ht
q
W0(kt) = f 0(kt)   (r + d) (21)
qut + bVt+1 = W(kt) (22)
Vt = ut + bVt+1, (23)
where the ﬁrst equation is obtained by differencing (13), the second equation is (14), the
third equation is the participation constraint with Wt = qut + bVt+1, and the last equation
is the recursion of Vt.
We ﬁrst linearize the system around the steady. Letting a hat denote deviations from
the steady state values, we obtain:
c00(u¥) ˆ ut   bRc00(u¥) ˆ ut 1 = ˆ ht   bR
(q   1)
q
ˆ ht 1 (20a)
h¥W00(k¥)ˆ kt +W0(k¥)ˆ ht = qf 00(k¥)ˆ kt (21a)
q ˆ ut + b ˆ Vt+1 = W0(k¥)ˆ kt (22a)
ˆ Vt = ˆ ut + b ˆ Vt+1. (23a)
27where the steady state values are the solution to:
W(k?) =

q +
b
1  b

u?
c0(u?) = h?

1+

bR
1  bR

1
q

h? =
f 0(k?)   (r + d)
W0(k?)/q
The system can be simpliﬁed down to two variables:
Lemma 3. Let xt = [ ˆ ut ˆ Vt]0. The linearized system (20a)-(23a) simpliﬁes to xt+1 = Bxt where
B =
2
4bR   1
1+k

bR
q   1
b(q 1)

1
1+k

bR
q   1
b(q 1)

 1
b
1
b
3
5,
and where k =
 c00(u¥)W0(k¥)2
qf00(k¥) h¥W00(k¥).
The matrix B has two eigenvalues, one larger than one in absolute value and the other
less than one in absolute value. The convergence of the system is governed by the eigen-
value less than one in magnitude. Setting c00(u) = 0 (the linear case), implies that k = 0
and we recover an eigenvalue bR

1  1
q

, the one for the linear case. For c00(u) > 0,
convergence is a more complicated expression of underlying parameters. To assess the
response of the system to q and risk aversion, we present some numerical examples in
Figure 4. Speciﬁcally, we consider power utility: u(c) = c1 s
1 s, for s = 0, 1, 1.5, and 2.25
The ﬁgure plots the convergence rate, deﬁned as 1 minus the relevant eigenvalue, for
each value s and for values of q 2 [1,20]. The ﬁrst thing to note is how close the speed of
convergence are to each other for s 2 [1,1.5,2]. Basically, the lines sit on top of each other.
It is also noteworthy how close they are to the one obtained in the linear case. The linear
model captures quite accurately the behavior around the steady states. Looking across
the plotted lines, we see that all else equal, a higher value of q is associated with slower
convergence, conﬁrming the comparative statics of the linear case.
The results above are about the behavior of the model in a neighborhood of the steady
state. Figure 5 presents global results for a set of simulations26 of the model for different
values of the risk aversion parameter s, where u(c) = c1 s
1 s. The ﬁgure plots the transition
25The other parameters are f(k) = ka, a = 1/3, r = d = 0.05, b = 1/(1+ r), and ¯ t = 0.50.
26The other parameters are f(k) = ka, q = 10. a = 1/3, r = d = 0.05, and ¯ t = 0.5. The numerical
implementation is done through value function iteration. The code is available at authors’ website.
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Figure 4: This ﬁgure depicts the sensitivity of convergence rates to q. The vertical axis is
the convergence rate, which is calculated as 1 minus the largest eigenvalue less than one of
the matrix B discussed in the text. Each line represents a different coefﬁcient of relative risk
aversion (s), as shown in the legend. Other parameters are: f(k) = k1/3, r = 0.05, d = 0.05,
and ¯ t = 0.5.
mapsoftheequilibriumtaxrate(writtenasdeviationsfromitssteadystatevalue)foreach
of the simulations. As can be seen from these plots, the linear utility model accurately
describes the dynamic behavior of the concave utility model not only locally, but also
globally.
The above two numerical results lead us to conclude that, quite differently from the
standard neoclassical model, concave utility does not change the dynamics in a quanti-
tatively signiﬁcant way with respect to the baseline linear model. This underscores the
dominant role political economy considerations play in determining the speed of conver-
gence in our environment.
4 RevisitingConvergenceintheNeoclassicalGrowthModel
A major prediction of the standard neoclassical growth model is conditional convergence;
that is, countries which are poor relative to their steady states grow relatively fast. Given
that our model is built on a neoclassical foundation, it shares this property as well. How-
ever, there are important differences in our model compared to the standard closed econ-
omy model, which is the focus of this section.
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Figure 5: This ﬁgure depicts transition mappings for the deviations of the tax rate with respect
to its steady state value. Each line represents a different coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion
(s). Other parameters are: f(k) = k1/3, r = 0.05, q = 10, d = 0.05, and ¯ t = 0.5. In panel (b),
b = 0.9.
Consider our benchmark linear model, setting bR = 1 and ¯ t = 1. From equation (16)
and the fact that ht = tt when ¯ t = 1, we have
tt =

1 
1
q
t
t0.
Theﬁrstorderconditionforcapitalimpliesthat tt = 1 (r+d)/f 0(kt) = 1  f 0(k¥)/f 0(kt),
where the second equality follows from k¥ = k? when bR = 1. In the case of Cobb-
Douglas production with capital share a, we then have

kt
k¥
1 a
= 1 

1 
1
q
t 
k0
k¥
1 a
.
Differentiating with respect to time implies:
(1  a)
˙ kt
kt
=  ln

1 
1
q
"
kt
k¥
a 1
  1
#
,
30or, using the fact that ˙ y/y = a˙ k/k:
˙ yt
yt
=  ln

1 
1
q

a
1  a
"
yt
y¥
 a 1
a
  1
#
.
In the neighborhood of the steady state, we can write this as:
˙ yt
yt
  ln

q
q   1

ln

yt
y¥

. (24)
In the terminology of the empirical growth literature, the speed of convergence in the
model is given by ln

q
q 1

 1/(q   1). For perspective, the comparable speed of con-
vergence in the standard Solow-Swan model is (1 a)d.27 A comparison of this term with
that in (24) highlights an important difference. Namely, in the standard model the capital
share is an important determinant of convergence, while it plays no role in our version
of the neoclassical growth model.28 In the standard model, the capital share determines
how much a unit of savings increases output. This parameter is therefore crucial in the
mapping of savings to additional output next period. In our model, external savings
by the government does not directly generate capital formation, but does so indirectly
through a reduction in the credible tax rate. The tax rate on capital governs the marginal
product of capital, and the linear dynamics for the marginal product of capital are, with
Cobb-Douglas production, passed through to output independently of the capital share.
The fact that we have replaced capital share with political economy frictions in the
speed of convergence is important in interpreting cross-sectional growth regressions. The
slowrateofconvergenceobservedempirically, whenviewedthroughthestandardmodel,
suggests a large capital share, on the order of 0.75 when using plausible values for other
parameters (see Barro and Sala-I-Martin, 2004 p. 59). This has generated a literature on
what is the appropriate notion of capital in the neoclassical model, such as Mankiw et al.
(1992) which extends the notion of capital to include human capital. In our framework,
slow convergence does not require a high capital share, but rather large political econ-
omy frictions. For the empirical growth literature, this framework suggests an emphasis
27More precisely, the speed of convergence is (1 a)(g+n+d), where g is the rate of exogenous techno-
logical progress and n is the population growth rate, both of which we have set to zero in our benchmark
model. See Barro and Sala-I-Martin (2004).
28In the concave utility version of our model, the curvature of the production function does enter the
expression for convergence (See lemma 3). However, we have explored the concave model of Section 3.2
numerically and found that capital share does not have a quantitatively large systematic impact on conver-
gence. This is in line with our ﬁndings regarding curvature of the utility function.
31on political economy frictions in determining the speed of convergence, in addition to
their possible effect on the steady state.29 However, on the negative side, capital share
has a relatively well deﬁned empirical measure and therefore allows quantitative tests
of the neoclassical growth model. The empirical measures of political frictions are not
as mature as those for capital share, making quantitative empirical tests of equation (24)
difﬁcult, but also a fruitful topic for future research.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a tractable variation on the neoclassical growth model that
explains why small open economies have dramatically different growth outcomes, and
the ones that grow fast do so while increasing their net foreign asset position. Figures 1
and 2 indicated that this pattern was driven by a net reduction in public debt combined
with an inﬂow of private capital in fast growing economies, and the reverse in shrinking
economies, facts consistent with the model developed in this paper. This paper focused
on the negative relationship between sovereign debt and growth induced by political
economy frictions. In an earlier paper (Aguiar et al., 2009), we explored how debt over-
hang can exacerbate volatility as well. This raises the intriguing possibility that political
economy frictions and the associated debt dynamics may jointly explain the negative re-
lationship between volatility and growth observed in the data, a question we leave for
future research.
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35A Exogenous Growth
In this appendix we extend the model to include exogenous growth and show that the benchmark
results are unaffected up to a re-normalization.
Supposethat yt = f(kt,(1+g)tlt), where g istherateofexogenouslabor-augmentingtechnical
progress. Constant returns to scale in production implies that yt = (1 + g)tf((1 + g) tkt,lt) or
(1+ g)tf(ˆ kt,lt), where ˆ xt  xt
(1+g)t, for x = k,c. The ﬁrm’s ﬁrst order condition can be written:
fk(kt,(1+ g)tlt) = r + d
fk(ˆ kt,lt) = r + d,
as fk is homogeneous of degree zero in k and l. We also have ˆ kt = (1 + g) tkt, so that (1  
¯ t)fk(ˆ kt,lt) = (1  ¯ t)fk(kt,(1+ g)tlt) = r + d. The budget constraint can be re-written:
b0 
¥
å
t=0
R t(1+ g)t
h
f(ˆ kt,lt)   (r + d)ˆ kt   ˆ ct
i
,
where we need r > g to ensure ﬁniteness of the budget set.
Let us assume that u(c) is homogeneous of degree 1   s, then the objective function can be
written:
¥
å
t=0
btu(ct) =
¥
å
t=0
bt(1+ g)(1 s)tu(ˆ ct),
where we need b(1+ g)1 s < 1. Turning to the deviation utility:
¯ c(kt) = f(kt,(1+ g)tlt)   (1  ¯ t)fk(kt,(1+ g)tlt)kt
= (1+ g)t
h
f(ˆ kt,lt)   (1  ¯ t)fk(ˆ kt,lt)ˆ kt
i
.
and we can deﬁne ˆ ¯ c(ˆ kt)  (1 + g) t¯ c(kt) = f(ˆ kt,lt)   (1   ¯ t)fk(ˆ kt,lt)ˆ kt. So, the deviation utility
is:
W(kt) = qu(¯ c(kt)) +
b
1  b
u(¯ c(k)) = (1+ g)(1 s)t

qu(ˆ ¯ c(ˆ kt)) + +
b
1  b
u(ˆ ¯ c(ˆ k))

.
Deﬁne ˆ W(ˆ kt) = (1+ g)(s 1)tW(kt), we have
ˆ W(ˆ kt) = qu(ˆ ¯ c(ˆ kt)) +
b
1  b
u(ˆ ¯ c(ˆ k)).
The planning problem can be written:
max
¥
å
t=0
bt(1+ g)(1 s)tu(ˆ ct)
36subject to:
b0 
¥
å
t=0
R t(1+ g)t
h
f(ˆ kt,lt)   (r + d)ˆ kt   ˆ ct
i
ˆ W(ˆ kt)  qu(ˆ ct) + b(1+ g)(1 s)
¥
å
s=t+1
bs t 1(1+ g)(1 s)(s t 1)u(ˆ cs)
ˆ kt  ˆ kt.
Now deﬁne ˆ R  1+r
1+g and ˆ b  b(1+ g)(1 s). Then, the planner’s problem above can be re-written:
max
¥
å
t=0
ˆ btu(ˆ ct)
subject to:
b0 
¥
å
t=0
ˆ R t
h
f(ˆ kt,lt)   (r + d)ˆ kt   ˆ ct
i
ˆ W(ˆ kt)  qu(ˆ ct) + ˆ b
¥
å
s=t+1
ˆ bs t 1u(ˆ cs)
ˆ kt  ˆ kt.
Note that this problem is isomorphic to the original problem, (P).
This discussion is important, not only to show that the results are robust to sustained techno-
logical improvements (a fact of the data), but also it highlights the following: a steady state in our
model, once augmented with exogenous growth, will feature constant debt to output ratios and
an output level that will be growing at the rate of g. In this environment, a country that grows at
a slower rate than g will accumulate liabilities as fraction of its output, and the opposite will hold
for a country that grows faster than g. If we take g, to a ﬁrst approximation, to be equal to the
growth rate of the U.S., then one should expect that countries that grew faster (slower) than the
U.S. should have increased (decreased) external assets relative to GDP. This is exactly what Figure
1 shows.
B Capitalist Insiders
In this section of the appendix we extend the benchmark model to include domestic capitalists
that enter the welfare functions of both the private agents setting initial policy and the subsequent
governments. Recall that a key distinguishing feature of a capitalist in our environment is the
ability to manage ﬁrms, a feature which prevented the government from converting savings into
productive capital itself. Speciﬁcally, suppose that a subset of the domestic population has en-
trepreneurial ability which enables them to operate the production technology. We assume that
all ﬁrms are managed by domestic entrepreneurs, but continue to assume the economy is open in
that ﬁrm ﬁnancing may originate abroad.
More concretely, consider an entrepreneur who manages a ﬁrm with capital stock k. This cap-
37ital stock is ﬁnanced through a combination of equity and debt ﬁnancing, where the entrepreneur
may own some of the equity. An entrepreneur hires workers and pays holders of debt and equity
using after tax proﬁts. We extend the limited commitment paradigm to encompass domestic en-
trepreneurs. That is, an entrepreneur can renege on the ﬁrm’s contracts and divert resources to his
or her own private gain. Let Ue(k) denote the lifetime utility of a manager who deviates given a
ﬁrm’s capital stock k. We provide a speciﬁc formulation of Ue(k) below; at this point, there is no
need to put additional structure on the deviation utility of the entrepreneurs. Given the lack of
commitment, ﬁrm ﬁnancing must be self-enforcing. If ce
t is the entrepreneur’s consumption absent
deviation, then the entrepreneur faces a ﬁnancing constraint of the form Ue(kt)  å
¥
s=0 bsu(ce
t+s),
for every t. This constraint is the individual ﬁrm’s counterpart to the government’s borrowing
constraint, and corresponds to the constraint studied in Alburquerque and Hopenhayn (2004).
Note that Ue(k) is the utility from deviation for the entrepreneur given the equilibrium actions of
all other agents, including the government.
We study the private agents’ planning problem.30 Let the private agents’ welfare function
be given by lu(cw) + (1   l)u(ce), where cw and ce are the per capita consumption of workers
and entrepreneurs, respectively, and l 2 (0,1] is the Pareto weight placed on workers. For ease
of exposition, we assume the government places weight l on workers as well, but this could be
relaxed. The planning problem can be written as:
max
¥
å
t=0
bt [lu(cw
t ) + (1  l)u(ce
t)] (P’)
subject to
b0 
¥
å
t=0
R t (f(kt)   cw
t   ce
t   kt+1 + (1  d)kt)   (1+ r)k0
W(kt)  q [lu(cw
t ) + (1  l)u(ce
t)] +
¥
å
s=1
bs [(lu(cw
t+s) + (1  l)u(ce
t+s))], 8t
Ue(kt)  å bsu(ce
t+s), 8t.
The aggregate resource constraint states that the present value of output minus consumption and
net investment must equal initial net foreign debt. This constraint is the same as (10), although
written in a slightly different way. The second constraint is the government’s participation con-
straint, which is modiﬁed to include both types of agents. We assume that the incumbent’s prefer-
ence for current consumption is uniform across agents. The ﬁnal constraint is the entrepreneur’s
participation constraint ensuring that ﬁrm ﬁnancing is self enforcing. Note that even though capi-
talists enter the welfare function of the government there is a temptation for the current incumbent
to expropriate capital when q > 1.
Before solving the planning problem, we discuss how the government’s deviation utility W(k)
is affected by the presence of insider capitalists. We maintain our assumption that if the gov-
ernment deviates, the economy reverts to the Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) under ﬁnancial
autarky. To set notation, let k denote the current capital stock inherited by the current incum-
bent, and k0 the capital stock bequeathed to the next government. Let V(k0) denote the contin-
uation value of the current incumbent if it leaves k0 to the next government. That is, V(kt) =
30The efﬁcient allocation from the planning problem can be decentralized with appropriate taxes and
transfers. We omit the details.
38ås bs[lu(cw
t+s)+(1 l)u(ce
t+s)], where the sequence of consumptions are chosen by future incum-
bent governments given the inherited state variable k. Similarly, let Ue(k0) denote the continuation
value of entrepreneurs conditional on k0. The current incumbent’s problem is therefore
W(k) = max
ce,cw,k0 q [lu(cw) + (1  l)u(ce)] + bV(k0) (25)
subject to
cw + ce + k0  f(k) + (1  d)k
u(ce) + bUe(k0)  Ue(k).
Note that we have set ¯ t = 1, so the government has access to total output. We continue to use
the notation Ue(k) to denote the entrepreneurs’ deviation utility, although this is a slight abuse of
notation – the value to an entrepreneur diverting with capital stock k will depend on the path of
taxation, which in general will be different in the MPE. Other than this last constraint, the MPE is
the closed economy neo-classical growth model with a quasi-hyperbolic decision maker.
Returning to the planning problem (P0), we let m0, R t htm0
lq , and R tm0gt be the multipliers on
the three constraints. The ﬁrst order conditions are:
1 = lu0(cw
t )
 
btRt
m
+

q   1
q

ht
l
+
t
å
s=0
bsRsht s
lq
!
(26)
1 = (1  l)u0(ce
t)
 
btRt
m
+

q   1
q

ht
l
+
t
å
s=0
bsRsht s
lq
+
1
1  l
t
å
s=0
bsRsgt s
!
(27)
f 0(kt) = r + d +
ht
lq
W0(kt) + gtUe0
(kt). (28)
Before analyzing the problem in detail, a few points are worth mentioning. The benchmark
casecanberecoveredbysetting l = 1andrelaxingtheentrepreneursborrowingconstraint gt = 0.
Even if l is less than one, the ﬁrst order condition for workers remains essentially the same as
before (compare (26) and (13)) – the only difference is a scaling factor. Moreover, conditions (26)
and (27) can be combined to yield:

1  l
l

u0(ce
t)
u0(cw
t )
+ u0(ce
t)
t
å
s=0
bsRsgt s = 1. (29)
This condition says that the plan allocates consumption to workers and entrepreneurs partially
according to their Pareto weights, but entrepreneurs may be given additional resources when
their borrowing constraint binds.
39B.1 The Linear Case Revisited
We now reconsider our benchmark results with linear utility. The case of l  1/2 provides a
straightforward extension of our basic model as there exists an interior optimum. If l > 1/2, then
the government strictly prefers workers to entrepreneurs as a group, and transferring resources
from the entrepreneurs to the workers relaxes the government’s constraint. Similarly, transferring
resource from entrepreneurs to workers raises the planner’s objective function. However, there is
a limit on how many resources can be transferred, as the entrepreneurs always have the option
to deviate. This ensures that entrepreneurial consumption is not driven to minus inﬁnity in the
linear case. We therefore assume l  1/2 in what follows. In the linear case, we also assume that
Ue(k) = f(k) + (1   d)k. That is, an entrepreneur that deviates simply consumes the output and
un-depreciated capital. In this formulation, the entrepreneur’s deviation utility is independent of
government actions.
In the linear case, we can rewrite (26) as:
1
l
=
btRt
m0
+

q   1
q

ht
l
+
t
å
s=0
bsRsht s
lq
.
Solving this equation for the path of ht, we have
ht = 1  bR + bR

1 
1
q

ht 1,
for t  1, and h0 = 1  l
m0. Thus the dynamics of ht are the same as before, save for the initial term
now has an explicit weight for the workers, l.
Turning to (29), we have
t
å
s=0
bsRsgt s = 1 
1  l
l
.
This implies that g0 = 1   1 l
l , and gt = (1   bR)g0 for t > 0. If l = 1/2, then gt = 0 for
all t. This follows as workers and entrepreneurs receive equal weights and have linear utility, so
the optimal plan will transfer resources from workers to entrepreneurs until the entrepreneur’s
constraint is slack. If bR = 1, then the entrepreneur’s constraint binds only in the initial period for
any l > 1/2. With linear utility and patience, the entrepreneur is willing to delay consumption
into the future (i.e., post a bond), relaxing the borrowing constraint. However, this does not imply
that capital is ﬁrst best – even if the borrowing constraint does not bind, the entrepreneur is subject
to government taxation. In all cases, gt is constant after the ﬁrst period and does not depend on
the polarization parameter q: the entrepreneur’s lack of commitment does not generate dynamics
beyond the ﬁrst period. Therefore, q only inﬂuences the dynamics of the economy through h, the
multiplier on the government’s participation constraint.
As in the benchmark case, the dynamics of ht pin down the dynamics of capital. Speciﬁ-
cally, from the ﬁrst order condition for capital we have f 0(kt)   r   d =
ht
lqW0(kt) + gtUe0
(kt).
After manipulating the envelope and ﬁrst order conditions from (25), we have W0(k) = q(1  
l)(f 0(k) + 1  d), where we have used the fact that Ue0
(k) = f 0(k) + 1   d and that l  1/2 to
40guarantee an interior solution. Substituting into the ﬁrst order condition for capital yields:
ht =
l
1  l

f 0(kt)   r   d
f 0(kt) + 1  d

  (1  bR)

2l   1
1  l

(30)
for all t  1. As in the benchmark model, ht is inversely related to kt.
This appendix has shown that the results derived in Section 3.1 carry over directly to an envi-
ronment in which domestic insiders manage ﬁrms.
C Generalized Political Process
In the section of the appendix we extend the political process. The model presented in the text
assumed that each party had the same odds of being the next period’s incumbent, regardless
of which party is currently in power. In this appendix, we extend the model to the case where
there may be an advantage to incumbency. Speciﬁcally, let gi,o be the probability that the current
incumbent loses ofﬁce, and go,i be the probability a party will regain ofﬁce, where all party’s
out of ofﬁce are treated symmetrically. We deviate from the text by dropping the assumption
1   gi,o = go,i. If 1   gi,o > go,i, then the incumbent has an advantage in retaining ofﬁce, and vice
versa if 1  gi,o < go,i.
Deﬁne pt,s as the probability the incumbent in period t is in power at time s  t, so pt,s satisﬁes
the difference equation pt,s+1 = (1  gi,o)pt,s + go,i(1  pt,s) with initial condition pt,t = 1. Solving
for pt,s:
pt,s =
go,i
gi,o + go,i
+
gi,o(1  gi,o   go,i)s t
gi,o + go,i
.
That is, the probability of being in power at some date s in the future is composed of two terms: a
constant term, representing the unconditional probability of being in power, plus an incumbency
advantage which vanishes as s goes to inﬁnity.
The counterpart to (6) in the generalized case is:
˜ Wt =
¥
å
s=t
bs tpt,s ˜ qu(cs) +
¥
å
s=t
bs t(1  pt,s)u(cs). (A6)
We obtain the generalization of our stand-in government as follows. Deﬁne g = gi,o + go,i, and
q = 1 +
(˜ q 1)gi,o
go,i ˜ q+gi,o 2 (1, ˜ q]. Note that this collapses to the case studied in the text by setting go,1 =
1   gi,o = p, so g = 1 and q = ˜ q/(p˜ q + 1   p). More generally, g 2 (0,1]. Substituting in to (A6),
we have the counterpart to (7):
Wt =
gi,o + go,i
go,i ˜ q + gi,o
˜ Wt
=
¥
å
s=t
bs t(1  g)s tqu(cs) +
¥
å
s=t
bs t(1  (1  g)s t)u(cs). (A7)
Note that we recover the case studied in the text by setting g = 1. As in the benchmark case, Wt is
41proportional to the incumbent’s true utility ˜ Wt, and therefore an allocation satisﬁes the participa-
tion constraints for ˜ Wt if and only if it does so for Wt.
All propositions from the benchmark model extend to the general case, as proven in Appendix
D, with the appropriate modiﬁcation of the expressions for general g  1.
D Proofs
In this section of the appendix we collect the proofs using the the general political process de-
scribed in Appendix C. The proofs for the benchmark case follow by setting g = 1.
Proof of Lemma 2
We begin with a generalized version of Lemma 2.
Lemma 2 (A). The utility to the population as of time t, Vt = å
¥
i=0 biut+i, is given by:
Vt =

1
q

Wt +
bg
q

1 
1
q
 ¥
å
i=0
bi

1 
g
q
i
Wt+1+i.
Proof. Using the deﬁnitions, we have
Vt = ut + bVt+1
Wt = qut + b(1  g)Wt+1 + bgVt+1.
Eliminating ut from the above and re-arranging:
q

Vt   b

1 
g
q

Vt+1

= Wt   b(1  g)Wt+1
q

1  b

1 
g
q

F

Vt = (1  b(1  g)F)Wt,
where F is the forward operator. Solving for Vt and eliminating explosive solutions:
qVt =
 
1  b(1  g)F
1  b
 
1 
g
q

F
!
Wt
= Wt + bg

1 
1
q
 ¥
å
i=0
bi

1 
g
q
i
Wt+1+i.
Dividing through by q yields the expression in the lemma.
42Proof of Lemma 1
Deﬁne W(k) to be the incumbent’s value function if it deviates given capital k. We can write this
as
W(k) = qu(¯ c(k)) + b(1  g)W + bgV, (31)
where W is the continuation value under the punishment if the incumbent retains power next
period, and V is the continuation value if it loses power. We normalize t = 0 to be the time of the
deviation, so we have W = W1 and V = V1. From Lemma A2, we have:
qV = qV1 = W1 + bg

1 
1
q
 ¥
å
i=0
bi

1 
g
q
i
W1+i.
As the punishment must be self-enforcing, we have Wt  qu(¯ c(kt)) + b(1   g)W + bgV, at each
t. Note that a second deviation is punished in the same way as the ﬁrst. The fact that W(k) is the
worst possible punishment implies that this maximizes the set of possible self-enforcing alloca-
tions, from which we are selecting the one with minimum utility. Substituting in the participation
constraint in the above expression yields:
qV  qu(¯ c(k1)) + b(1  g)W + bgV
+ bg

1 
1
q
 ¥
å
i=0
bi

1 
g
q
i
(qu(¯ c(k1+i)) + b(1  g)W + bgV)

 
1  b(1  g)
1  b
 
1 
g
q

!
(qu(¯ c(k)) + b(1  g)W + bgV),
where the last inequality uses the fact that kt  k, for all t. Rearranging, we have
V 
(1  b(1  g))(u(¯ c(k)) + b(1  g)W)
q(1  b) + b2g(1  g)
. (32)
Recall that W1 = W. Participation at t = 1 requires W1  qu(¯ c(k1)) + bW + bgV, or using the fact
that k1  k:
W  qu(¯ c(k)) + b(1  g)W + bgV.
Substituting (32) in for V and rearranging yields:
W 

q   1
1  b(1  g)
+
1
1  b

u(¯ c(k)).
Substituting back into (32), we have
V 
u(¯ c(k))
1  b
.
The left hand sides of these last two inequalities are the government’s and private agent’s utility,
respectively, from the Nash equilibrium repeated ad inﬁnitum. As repeated Nash is a self enforc-
ingequilibriumandboundsfrombelowthepunishmentpayoff, itistheself-enforcingequilibrium
that yields the lowest utility for the deviating government.
43The Generalized Problem
One can then write the equivalent of problem (P):
V(b0) = max
fct,ktg
¥
å
t=0
btu(ct) (AP)
subject to:
b0 
¥
å
t=0
R t (f(kt)   (r + d)kt   ct), (A10)
W(kt) 
¥
å
s=t
bs t(1  g)s tqu(cs) +
¥
å
s=t
bs t(1  (1  g)s t)u(cs), 8t (A11)
k  kt (A12)
Let m0 be the multiplier on the budget constraint (A10), R tm0ht/q be the multiplier on the se-
quence of constraints on participation (A11) and R tft be the multiplier on (A12).
The necessary ﬁrst order conditions are:
c0(ut) = (bR)t
 
1
m0
+
t
å
s=0
(bR) s  
(1  g)t s(q   1) + 1
 hs
q
!
(A13)
ht
q
W0(kt) = f 0(kt)   (r + d) + ft, 8t  0 (A14)
where ft = 0 if kt > k.
Proof of Proposition 1
To prove the proposition, suppose that kt did not converge to k. Deﬁne Te = ftjkt < k   eg. It
follows that for some e > 0, Te has inﬁnite members. Then from (A13):
c0(ut) =
1
m0
+
t
å
s=0
 
(1  g)t s(q   1) + 1
 hs
q

1
m0
+ å
s2Te,st
hs
q

1
m0
+ å
s2Te,st
Ce
where Ce  (f 0(k   e)   (r + d))/(W0(k   e)/q) > 0, and the inequalities reﬂect hs,fs  0 for
all s and hs  Ce for s 2 Te. It follows then that c0(ut) diverges to inﬁnity, and thus ut converges
to its maximum. But this implies that the participation constraints will stop binding at some ﬁnite
t0, which leads to hs that are zero for all s > t0, a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 2
The generalized version of Proposition 2 is as follows:
44Proposition 2 (A). The multiplier ht satisﬁes the following difference equation:
ht+1 = (1  (1  g)bR)(1  bR) + bR

1 
g
q

ht , 8t  1 (A16)
with h0 = 1   m 1
0 and h1 = 1   bR +
bR(q 1)g
q h0. The sequence of ht converges monotonically from
t  1 towards its steady state value h¥:
h¥ =
q(1  (1  g)bR)(1  bR)
q(1  bR) + bRg
.
Letting ˆ ht  ht   h¥, convergence to the steady state can be characterized by:
ˆ ht+1 = bR

1 
g
q

ˆ ht.
Proof. The generalized counterpart of (15) is:
(bR) t  
t
å
s=0
(bR) s  
(1  g)t s(q   1) + 1
 hs
q
=
1
m0
, 8t  0 (A15)
We have that from (A15) at t + 1:
(bR) (t+1)  
t
å
s=0
(bR) s  
(1  g)t s(q   1) + 1
 hs
q
  (bR) (t+1)ht+1 = m0
which can be written as:
(bR) (t+1)   (1  g)
t
å
s=0
(bR) s

(1  g)t s(q   1) + 1+
1
1  g
  1

hs
q
 (bR) (t+1)ht+1 = m0
where using (A15) at t we get:
(bR) (t+1)   (1  g)(bR)t  
t
å
s=0
(bR) sg
hs
q
  (bR) (t+1)ht+1 = m0   (1  g)m0 (33)
Subtracting (33) at t from (33) at t + 1:
(bR) (t+1)   (bR) t   (1  g)((bR)t   (bR)t 1)
  g(bR) tht
q
+ (bR) tht   (bR) (t+1)ht+1 = 0
which delivers the result once simpliﬁed for t  1. Using (A15) at t = 0 delivers h0 = (1   m0)/q.
And using (A15) at t = 1 delivers that
h1 = 1  bR +
bR(q   1)g
q
h0
The steady state value can be computed in the usual way. Given that the slope of (A16) is positive
and less than one, convergence and monotonicity follow.
45Note that substituting g = 1 delivers the results for Proposition 2.
Dynamics of kt and the proof of Corollary 1
Proposition 2(A) characterized the dynamics of ht. One can then, from here, deliver the associated
dynamics for kt. For any given value of ht, deﬁne K(ht) to be the solution to:
ht =
f 0(K(ht))   (r + d)
W0(K(ht))/q
The convexity assumption guarantees that the above has a unique solution, and that K(ht) is
strictly decreasing in ht. Now, let ¯ h to be such that K(¯ h) = k. Then the optimal path for kt will be:
kt =
(
K(ht) ; for ht < ¯ h
k ; otherwise
Given that h¥ is monotone, this implies that the path for kt will also be monotone. Figure 6 shows
the dynamics of the system, taking the account the possibility that the upper bound constraint on
the tax rates might bind.
Deﬁne now ¯ q to be the value such that:
f 0(k)   (r + d)
¯ c0(k)
=
¯ q(1  (1  g)bR)(1  bR)
¯ q(1  bR) + bRg
 ¯ h.
Hence, the long run level of capital will be:
k¥ =
(
K(h¥) ; for q < ¯ q
k ; otherwise
This proves the ﬁrst part of the proposition (when plugging in for g = 1). For the second part,
note that higher debt implies a (weakly) higher multiplier m0, and a higher h0. Given that h1 and
ht are monotonic in previous values, it follows that the entire path of h increases with m0 and debt.
That is, a higher level of debt leads to a lower capital path.
Proof of Proposition 3
The proof of this proposition follows directly from Lemma 2(A) , the fact that kt is monotone, and
that W(k) is an increasing function of k.
Proof of Corollary 2
Let suppose that kt is increasing. Let Bt = å
¥
s=t Rs t(f(ks)   (r + d)ks   cs) denote the stock of
debt outstanding in period t. Suppose, to generate a contradiction, that BT+1 > BT for some
T  1. Let fut,ktg denote the equilibrium allocation. Now consider the alternative allocation:
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45
ht
ht+1
1
ht+1
h1 h¥
ht
kt
¯ h
k?
¯ k
1 0
Figure 6: Transition mapping for ht when bR < 1. The blue line in the diagram on the
left represents the transition mapping as given by equation (A16) for t  1. The dashed
line represents a possible equilibrium path starting from h1 = 1   bR +
bR(q 1)g
q
(1 m)
q . The
diagram on the right shows the relationship between ht and the capital kt.
˜ ut = ut and ˜ kt = kt for t < T, and ˜ ct = ct+1 and ˜ kt = kt+1 for t  T. That is, starting with period
T, we move up the allocation one period. As ˜ V0   V0 = bT( ˜ VT   VT) = bT(VT+1   VT) > 0, the
objective function has increased and where the last inequality follows from the monotonicity of
Vt. Similarly, ˜ B0   B0 = R T( ˜ BT   BT) = R T(BT+1   BT) > 0, the budget constraint is relaxed,
where the last inequality follows from the premise BT+1 > BT. For t  T, we have ˜ Wt = Wt+1 
W(kt+1) = W(˜ kt), so participation holds for period T and after. For t < T, note that Wt =
å
T 1
s=t bs t 
(1  g)s t(q   1) + 1

us + bT(1   g)TWT + bT(1   (1   g)Tt)VT+1. As ˜ WT > WT and
˜ VT > VT, we have ˜ Wt > Wt for all t < T. As ˜ kt = kt for t < T, our new allocation satisﬁes the
participation constraints of the governments along the path. Therefore, we have found a feasible
allocation that is a strict improvement, a contradiction of optimality. A similar argument works
for a decreasing path of kt.
Proof of Proposition 4
This was proved in the main text.
Proof of Proposition 5
From (19), we have
B¥ =

1+ r
r

(f(k¥)   (r + d)k¥   c¥).
47Recall that k¥ is a continuous function of q, and by deﬁnition, k¥ = k at q = ¯ q. Therefore,
limq!¯ q k¥ = k. So
lim
q!¯ q
B¥ =

1+ r
r

f(k)   (r + d)k   lim
q!¯ q
c¥

. (34)
Using the fact that Wt = W(kt) along the path and the deﬁnition of W(k), we have:

q   1
1  b(1  g)
+
1
1  b

c¥ = q (¯ c(k¥)   ¯ c(k)) +

q   1
1  b(1  g)
+
1
1  b

¯ c(k),
or
c¥ = q

q   1
1  b(1  g)
+
1
1  b
 1
(¯ c(k¥)   ¯ c(k)) + ¯ c(k). (35)
This implies, limc¥ = ¯ c(k)  f(k)   (1   ¯ t)f 0(k)k = f(k)   (r + d)k, where the last equality
follows from the deﬁnition of k. Plugging into (34) gives limB¥ = 0, which is the ﬁrst part of the
proposition.
For the second part, we have
lim
q!¯ q 
dB¥
dq
=

1+ r
r
 
f 0(k)   (r + d)

lim
q!¯ q 
dk¥
dq
  lim
q!¯ q 
dc¥
dq

. (36)
Equation (35) implies:
lim
q!¯ q 
dc¥
dq
= ¯ q
 ¯ q   1
1  b(1  g)
+
1
1  b
 1
¯ c0(k) lim
q!¯ q 
dk¥
dq
=
¯ q(1  (1  g)b)(1  b)
¯ q(1  b) + bg
¯ c0(k) lim
q!¯ q 
dk¥
dq
From the deﬁnition of ¯ q we have that:
f 0(k)   (r + d) =
¯ q(1  (1  g)bR)(1  bR)
¯ q(1  bR) + bRg
¯ c0(k)
Plugging these back into (36):
lim
q!¯ q 
dB¥
dq
=

1+ r
r
 ¯ q(1  (1  g)bR)(1  bR)
¯ q(1  bR) + bRg
 
¯ q(1  (1  g)b)(1  b)
¯ q(1  b) + bg


 ¯ c0(k) lim
q!¯ q 
dk¥
dq
The term inside the square brackets is strictly negative as long as R > 1, and ¯ c0(k) > 0 given
that ¯ t > 0 by assumption. The result follows as k¥ strictly decreases with q for q < ¯ q. This
last statement follows from the fact that dk¥
dq = K0(h¥)
dh¥
dq , together with
dh¥
dq > 0 if bR < 1 (see
Proposition A2), and K0(h) < 0 (from the convexity assumption).
48Proof of Proposition 6
The proof proceeds by noticing that ˆ ct = ct + yt where ct is an optimal consumption sequence
in the economy without debt is optimal in the economy with debt. To see this, note that the
participation constraints are still holding tight, as both Wt and the deviation increase by the same
amount. The present value constraint on the resources of the government has not changed. And
the ﬁrst order conditions remain the same as before.
Proof of Lemma 3
From equation (21a) we get:
ˆ kt =
W0(k¥)
qf 00(k¥)   h¥W00(k¥)
ˆ ht
Using this and (22a), we get:
ˆ ht = ((q   1) ˆ ut + ˆ Vt)

W0(k¥)2
qf 00(k¥)   h¥W00(k¥)
 1
where we also used (23a). Plugging back for ˆ ht and ˆ ht 1 into (20a) using the above expression,
and simplifying the resulting equation together with (23a), the results follows.
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